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A CAVEAT ON CRIME CONTROL
HERBERT WECHSLER'
Public interest in the prevention of crime has increased tre-
mendously in the last two years, but no substantial progress has
been made in bringing the American public closer to an understand-
ing of the problems that such prevention involves. The Attorney-
General of the United States called a conference on crime followed
by similar conferences in various states including New York.
Governor Lehman presented a legislative program emanating from
his conference which purported to cover the field. A special
prosecutor has been investigating "racketeering" in New York
City and has obtained convictions. There has been ample publicity
for all these activities. But none of the dilemmas which lie at the
root of any effort to deal with crime by law has been exposed to
public view. On the contrary, the crime conferences fostered the
belief that because they were attended by "scientists" and "experts"
any proposals made by them proceeded from a fund of knowledge
adequate, or nearly adequate, to solve the practical problems of
crime control. In addition, there has been an impressive series of
newspaper and motion picture glorifications of the police work of
Mr. J. Edgar Hoover and his Bureau and of the integrity and
ability as prosecutors of men like Mr. Dewey in New York. As
a result, the faith that crime programs of the Lehman type, police
work of the Hoover type, and prosecution of the Dewey type will
substantially eliminate crime is almost as widely held as the belief
that the Bureau of Investigation fulfills the principal function of
the Department of Justice of the United States.
To attack this popular faith is a task which is unpleasant for
several obvious reasons. The criminal law shares with the rest of
our law the need of a careful and critical revaluation; the crime
conferences were, potentially at least, a step in that direction and
the crime programs, including Governor Lehman's, contain some
useful measures which have often been insincerely criticized. Police
organization and personnel in the major part of the United States
are incredibly poor and the organization and personnel of the
Bureau of Investigation constitute a genuine improvement. Prosecu-
I Assistant Professor of Law, Columbia University, New York City.
[629]
HERBERT WECHSLER
tion in this country has long suffered from the twin diseases of
inefficiency and corruption, and we sorely need the kind of corrective
that able special prosecutors from time to time supply. Finally,
we have all used bitter words about the public's apathy towards the
crime problem and it seems somewhat ungenerous to complain when
that apathy suddenly turns into vociferous enthusiasm for getting
something done.
It is nevertheless important, for much weightier reasons, that
the popular faith to which I alluded be attacked and that students
of the crime problem devote some time to attacking it. It is
important because oversimplification of the problems of crime and
of the criminal law has led the public to expect results that
the criminal law machine will never produce, may lead to the
uncritical acceptance in the name of crime control of measures that
are profoundly unwise and will make it progressively more difficult
to direct popular enthusiasm along the most productive channels.
A brief reconsideration of the ultimate dilemmas of criminal justice
may therefore not be without value. At the least, it may serve to
make clear that crime conference law reform, more successful
police, and more capable prosecution cannot cut as deeply into the
tough tissues of crime as the public has been led to suppose. At
the most, it may provoke thought as to the most profitable area of
practical activity, for, as Tawney remarked, "the practical thing for
a traveler who is uncertain of his path is not to proceed with the
utmost rapidity in the wrong direction: it is to consider how to find
the right one." In any case, it may assist in drafting the message
which can with least danger be heralded abroad.
I.
The two major problems of the substantive law are those of
determining what behavior should be declared to be criminal and
what to do with persons who are convicted of engaging in such
behavior. Since the end to be achieved is the protection of the
public against human behavior that has undesirable consequences,
the determination of what behavior to make criminal presents three
issues: (1) what consequences of behavior is it desirable to prevent;
(2) what behavior tends to produce these consequences, directly or
indirectly, or serves to identify persons who are likely to engage
in such behavior; (3) which of these forms of behavior can be
prevented by the methods of the criminal law, without causing
more harmful consequences than the prevention achieved is worth?
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The criminal law can achieve results only by the treatment of actual
offenders, but methods of treatment vary and they may operate to
prevent crimes in different ways. They may operate upon the
offender himself by incapacitating, intimidating or reforming him
and they may operate on potential offenders in the remainder of the
population, deterring them by the force of example. The deter-
mination of what to do with persons who are convicted of crime
therefore presents three issues: (1) what methods of treatment
best serve the various possible ends of treatment; (2) to what extent
are the various ends of treatment in harmony or in conflict with one
another; (3) where they are in conflict, what is their relative
importance. That there is an intimate relationship between the
behavior and treatment problems is obvious since the disadvantages
as well as the advantages of making behavior criminal will turn
very largely on the character of the treatment prescribed,2 and the
choice of treatment .methods is affected, at least in part, by the
reasons for making the behavior criminal.3
In its broadest aspect, the determination of what behavior to
make criminal is a somewhat larger problem than that of determin-
ing what sort of social order we desire to have, for it includes the
determination of the extent to which the criminal law is a desirable
and effective method of achieving it. It is not surprising therefore
that we do not suffer from an over-production of wise solutions.
It is also quite startling to reflect that these issues cannot be avoided
in any genuine revision of the penal law, that, to paraphrase another
remark of Tawney's, its revisors will make a decision even if they
refuse to decide. Revision accordingly faces the paradoxes of all
law reform which must for political reasons be subservient to the
social and economic status quo though its purpose is to build for
a changing society in a troubled world.
4
2 Assume that it is desirable to prevent the labor of children in industry and
that it is therefore proposed to make the employment of children criminal. Com-
pare the relative disadvantages which such action is likely to entail if the treat-
ment prescribed for the offending employer is a fine commensurate with the
profits derived from such employment and if it is a long term of imprisonment.
3 Thus if we make gambling criminal because we hope to deter the general
population from gambling (naive idea!) it is foolish to think about treating
gamblers as dangerous persons. On the other hand, if we are convinced that
only dangerous persons engage in particular behavior, such as possessing machine
guns, or associating with men of ill-repute, and make the. behavior criminal
for that reason, it is equally foolish to think about treating such persons for the
sake of deterring others rather than for the sake of their own incapacitation and
reformation.
4 The problem is not limited to the reconsideration of particular crimes in-
volving behavior like labor union activity or the payment of inadequate wages,
which is the center of social controversy. It includes all legal devices and in-
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Many students of the criminal law seek to avoid these paradoxes
by confining their thinking to the existing catalogue of major crimes,
on the theory that the behavior comprehended within the legal
categories of homicide, serious bodily injury, arson, kidnapping,
burglary, robbery, larceny and perhaps extortion and embezzle-
ment would be offensive in any society. They are concerned with
preventing this behavior and particularly with the elimination of the
professional criminal. But not even this seemingly safe ground
escapes major dilemmas. If the law is to achieve its maximum
efficacy in preventing, for example, physical violence, it is not
sufficient merely to make it criminal to cause such violence inten-
tionally, or even negligently. Behavior must be singled out which
makes violence probable in the long run or identifies individuals
who are dangerously likely to cause it; and it must be made criminal
regardless of the results in the particular case. Thus reckless driving
is criminal, and, on the same theory, so are attempts, solicitation,
conspiracies and various kinds of assembly and disorderly conduct.
Not even this, however, is deemed to be sufficient to reach the pro-
fessional criminal and, again on the same theory, public enemy
laws, elaborate vagrancy statutes and catch-all anti-racketeering
measures are advanced. It is at this point that the dilemma sets
in, for the broader and more effective such measures are as
weapons against the professional criminal, the greater also is the
danger that they will be employed against strikers, labor organizers,
political reformers and others who may incur the displeasure of the
police. The danger here, be it noted, is not only that of corruption
and abuse; it is the far more fundamental one, which criminologists
often fail to note, that not all behavior which threatens violence or
destruction of property is equally undesirable and some may not
be undesirable at all. Labor unions make strikes probable and
strikes involve a danger of violence, but this evil is totally incom-
mensurate with the evil of abolishing labor unions or prohibiting
strikes. A demonstration of unemployed may create a danger of
riot but it may also be the efficient cause of a grant of relief that
will prevent starvation. A similar point holds with regard to
"racketeering," for a capitalist economy often posits difficulties in
distinguishing "racketeering" activity from clever financing, the
exploitation of new opportunities, shrewd competition or even
aggressive labor leadership. Not all of these difficulties are overcome
strumentalities which, once created, may be utilized to tilt the scales of social
controversy one way or the other.
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by Mr. Dewey's definition of racketeering as "the systematic extor-
tion of money through intimidation by an organization conducted
for that purpose"' for the whole problem resides in the question
what is "intimidation" and What is permissible pressure or per-
suasion? Since laws must be drafted in general terms, difficulties
such as these can be met only by conferring upon administrative
officers a discretion which involves dangers, well marked in our
times, to which many crime experts remain remarkably insensitive,
although these dangers are at least as serious as those of crime
itself.6
These difficulties are slight and narrowly restricted, however,
compared to the dilemmas of the treatment problem arising through-
out the entire field of the criminal law. Punishment is necessarily
uncertain and men fear it to an indeterminate and inconstant degree,
which no one can measure or hope to measure. There is an
indefinite and unascertainable limit to the severity of the penalties
which complainants, prosecutors, judges and juries will be willing
to enforce and when that limit is crossed, nullification is reached.
Undue bloodshed and cruelty inflicted in the name of the law have
the same deleterious effect upon public morals as undue bloodshed
and cruelty inflicted in the name of anything else, and, in addition,
stimulate hatred of the law. But in what scale are bloodshed and
cruelty to be weighed to determine if they are undue? Men who
are brutally treated in prison tend to an unknown extent to risk
their promising careers after release in satisfying an understandable
thirst for revenge. Inadequate penalties, on the other hand, dis-
courage enforcement and provoke, to an incalculable and varying
extent, lynching and self-help. Some men are dangerous and others
are not; some are corrigible and others are not, but how can those
who are corrigible be separated from those who are not with
reasonable confidence? And how are we to set about with some
assurance reforming those who are corrigible until someone tells
us what Plato could not; how virtue is taught? And even if
they are reformed, how are jobs to be found for them without
encouraging the unemployed to commit crimes? The doubts created
5 Governor's Conference on Crime, the Criminal and Society, p. 721.
6 1 heartily agree with those who argue that genuine progress towards a
more rigorous criminal law machinery must come through the instrumentality of
more and more extended judicial and administrative discretion. My point is the
traditional one that such progress may not be worth the price, particularly in
our own time and place. I am not at all impressed in this regard by the course
of foreign development. If we are to qvoid dictatorship, we must be content to
face problems that are of trivial importance to a dictator.
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by these reflections may be intensified when one recognizes that
the best methods of terrifying potential offenders are likely to
be the worst means for reforming actual offenders; that no one
knows, in spite of recent pronouncements on the subject, whether
more crime can be prevented in the one way or in the other.
In any event, prisons are both few in number and expensive to
maintain and any marked increase in the death penalty would
not be politically feasible even if it were practically wise.
That these dilemmas are genuine is indicated clearly enough
in current debate. Policemen argue for stern penalties and shout
down parole. Humanitarians and social workers plead for light or
indeterminate sentences and efforts to reform. Psychiatrists seri-
ously maintain that they know how to separate the harmless from
the dangerous and the corrigible from the incorrigible and to reform
the corrigible. At the same time that they deny that morality can
be distinguished from the mores, they denounce the moral pre-
occupations of the law as unjust, preach the theological virtue of
charity in scientific disguise and urge that the criminal courts be
turned into psychiatric clinics. In spite of much profession of co-
operation and mutual esteem, one group does not really understand
any of the others and this for the excellent reason that they all
overstate their knowledge and take only a partial view of the
problem. The unwelcome truth may be that there is no genuine
solution to the ultimate dilemmas of treatment, because there is no
knowledge sufficient to guide a rational choice. Bentham's insiiht
that the only choices to be made are choices among evils carries
with it the conclusion that none can be made with conviction or
satisfaction.
I.
The two major procedural problems are those of apprehension
and trial of suspected persons. The problem of apprehension in-
volves two questions: (1) what methods of keeping tabs on the
population, conducting investigations and making arrests are likely
to be most effective; (2) of these methods which should the police
be permitted to employ? The first question is easier to answer
than the second because it involves only a selection of means to
a single end and knowledge is adequate for the choice. But the
second question is one of ends as well as means since the appre-
hension of suspected persons is not the only end of government.
Police practices which are effective means of apprehension may
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seriously disserve such other ends as the preservation of general
security. This is a point which peculiarly escapes those students
of crime who constantly contrast the modernity of the methods of
the criminal and the antiquity of the "legal obstacles" with which
we surround those whom we expect to catch him. The criminal's
job is a less responsible one than the policeman's and he can afford
to take more chances. Most of the "legal obstacles" are designed
to keep policemen responsible to their complex allegiances as
officers of the state and the law, recognizing the sad facts that
they may make errors of judgment, moral slips and may even
become the tools of those whose primary concern is not the common
good. Thus proposals for universal finger-printing, more extensive
powers of arrest, search and examination, simpler extradition pro-
cedure, broader extradition rules or the total abolition of extradition
formalities raise dilemmas as serious as those presented by the
substantive law. Such measures may make it easier to catch crimi-
nals; they may also achieve other results ranging from the industrial
blacklist and the shooting of wrongly suspected persons to the
facilitation of a fascist coup d'etat.
Similar dilemmas are presented by some at least of the proposals
designed to make it easier to obtain convictions by the creation of
presumptions to relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving
a prima facie case and the abolition of such legal protections as
are granted the accused by the presumption of innocence, the
requirement of a unanimous verdict, the rule forbidding comment on
the defendant's failure to testify, the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and the limitations on proof of defendant's character.
Efficiency in prosecution must be measured by the success with
which the guility are convicted and the innocent acquitted. But
such is the nature of judicial proof that guilt and innocence can
never be certainly known by the tribunal and any devices which
make it easier to convict the guilty also make it easier to convict
the innocent. On which side is it better that the balance be weighted?
The prosecutor's stock answer is that we have worried sufficiently
long about fairness to persons accused of crime and should now
begin to worry about the people who are injured by crime. But
the question somehow survives the answer. The difficulty magnifies
when one ruminates on the problem of prosecution as only one step
in the many processes of the criminal law. We are uncertain what
to try to do with convicted persons and still more uncertain that we
can succeed in doing what we decide to try to do. With all the
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present difficulties of prosecution the number of persons convicted
of crime annually is tremendously large as it is. How likely is it
then that a somewhat increased conviction rate will substantially
alter the crime budget?
These dilemmas are avoided by measures that are designed
merely to improve the organization, personnel and technique of
police and prosecution. They are also avoided by efforts to improve
the calibre of jury service. They would be avoided too by steps to
improve the caliber of judges and to eliminate official dishonesty
at all stages of the proceedings. It may be questioned indeed
whether this is not the focal point of the whole complex of problems
subsumed under the term "racketeering." Unless private groups,
like the Mayor's Committee recently formed in New York City,
state their problem in this way there is no reason to believe that
good may come of their activities. Even if they do, however, it is
well to remember that citizens' committees find it easier to talk
about the link between crime and politics than to do anything to
break it. This much at least the age of the link attests. Reforms
such as these are worth seeking, however, for their own sake,
and the improvement to be anticipated if they ever are made lies
much more largely in the general satisfactions of better government
than in the particular satisfaction of a reduction of the amount of
crime. Moreover, even if the crime rate should be somewhat
reduced the world would remain much the same. The New York
prostitutes whom Mr. Dewey may have freed from wage slavery
are likely to remain slaves to their profession.7
III.
The dilemmas are also avoided, of course, by crime prevention
through instrumentalities other than the criminal law. Man becomes
good socially by being good individually and the general means
to individual goodness are education, freedom from economic and
physical handicaps, and the opportunity to function and be of
service. This much follows from an understanding of man as a
rational animal and it is unnecessary to point for corroboration
to the findings of empirical research that most criminals are the
underprivileged offspring of underprivileged parents. It is, with
71 hope that the context makes clear that I do not intend to deny that there
is immediate value in incapacitating the men whose conviction Mr. Dewey has
thus far secured. My remark is addressed to the more remote consequences of
such convictions.
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relatively minor exceptions, all that we know of the ultimate causes
of crime. Hence the most satisfactory method of crime prevention
is the solution of the basic problems of government-the production
and distribution of external goods, education and recreation. Not
even education and recreation alone will do, as any social worker
will testify. The educated and recreated pauper asks why he is a
pauper and may not be satisfied with the answer. Even Lord
Coke conceded the essentials of the point, at the end of the "Third
Institute." Provide for the "good education of youth" and prevent
idleness by "teaching honest trades" he admonished in what is
perhaps the only one of his dicta that American lawyers might
hesitate to cite.
That the problems of social reform present dilemmas of their
own, I do not pretend to deny. I argue only that one can say for
social reform as a means to the end of improved crime control what
can also be said for better personnel but cannot be said for drastic
tightening of the processes of the criminal law-that even if the end
should not be achieved, the means is desirable for its own sake. I
argue, finally, that this should have been the primary message of
the crime conferences and that this is the story which the news-
papers should have carried.
